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Raymond Aron spent his life defending “liberal democracy.” What is the status of liberal democracy and the study of it today? Any “casual look” 
shows a close relationship between authoritarian and poor countries, on the one 
hand, and democratic regimes and rich countries, on the other. This question has 
been part of the research agenda since at least 1960, when Lipset1 questioned the 
relationship between democracy and development. Empirical research distin-
guishes two “causal mechanisms” in order to explain the correlation: democra-
cies emerge in economically developing dictatorships either by an “endogenous” 
process or for other “exogenous” reasons, but they survive longer in developed 
countries and so there is an accumulation of democratic regimes in these coun-
tries. The first mechanism assumes that dictatorships die when countries ruled 
by them develop because such countries can no longer be governed effectively 
by command or because—more crudely stated—the political systems there are 
determined by economic factors. This is a mechanism consistent with modern-
ization theory: there is one general process, which begins with industrialization 
and urbanization, goes through education and mass communication, and culmi-
nates in social and political mobilization and democratization. Adam Przeworski 
summarizes thus: GDP per capita is the most suitable indicator predicting the 
type of regime.2 If so, China will be democratic when it develops. A second 
type of mechanism was also ambiguously suggested by Lipset,3 but has only 
recently been explored. It is based on the assumption that if democracies emerge 
randomly during the development stage, they are more likely to survive in a 
rich country, and there is also a cumulative effect of monotonic convergence,4 
which is also consistent with the correlation between the two factors. This sec-
ond hypothesis is consistent with the role of human freedom in history. Men 
make democracies emerge and the environment is responsible only for allowing 
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them to survive, and so the level of development seems to have an explanatory 
power for the survival of democracies.5
And yet the discovery that in some countries dictatorships survive develop-
ment and in others democracies fl ourish against all odds has led researchers to 
conclude that there is no single explanation. Despite these negative lessons, which 
compel us to weaken the correlations, we are still reluctant to admit the histori-
cal diversity implicit in the object of our research. One of the presuppositions 
of the type of data-handling common today in empirical political science is that 
what we are discussing are unvarying phenomena (democracy, development), 
and that these maintain constant relationships with each other that are capable 
of appearing in correlation. Democracy is therefore always the same old phe-
nomenon that we have seen spread, to some extent, across the globe over the last 
century. Moreover, it is supposed that there are constant relationships between 
the sectors of reality, the economic and political system, religion, and so on, even 
when the sociological regularities detected do not appear timeless.
In Raymond Aron, we encounter a respect for, and a persistent desire to 
tackle head-on, the irreducible plurality of causes complicating the world we 
inhabit. The tendencies he observes are never declared to be laws, and so we 
never fi nd him prophesying the “end of history” or the “victory of the market.” 
In our exuberance to push ahead mercilessly in search of irrefutable scientifi c 
explanations for change, we occasionally forget that the conditions for change 
are themselves susceptible to change, and sometimes very rapid change. The web 
of causality is complex, and democracy comes in many diff erent forms, for many 
diff erent reasons. Nevertheless, for all of its numerous variations throughout his-
tory, democracy retains certain core features and principles. Part of Aron’s proj-
ect on industrial society was to investigate what is essential and what is variable 
in democracy or the constitutional-pluralist regime, as he preferred to call it.
Perrine Simon-Nahum’s chapter traces the evolution of Aron’s philosophy 
of history over the course of his lifetime. We are privy to the early intellectual 
considerations of the young French philosopher in the 1930s and how he shaped 
even his sociological approach around his ongoing engagement with determin-
ing man’s understanding of and role in history.
Giulio De Ligio’s chapter on “The Question of Political Regime and the 
Problems of Democracy” situates Aron’s political insights in the French liberal 
school of Montesquieu and Tocqueville. What these thinkers did was to take the 
importance of a sociological approach into account while at the same time never 
losing sight of the decisive infl uence of the political sphere on society—that is, 
the primacy of the political. De Ligio places Aron within this venerable tradition 
and also establishes a continuity between him and the ancient Greeks.
Daniel Mahoney’s chapter examines Aron’s defense of the constitutional-
pluralist regime in the face of totalitarianism in both its Nazi and Soviet forms. 
Aron’s later work suggests that the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union might not 
have been an aberration from Marx’s ideas, but in fact a necessary consequence 
of them, for those ideas try to remake the human condition. In this light, Aron’s 
arguments against totalitarianism constitute a defense, not only of constitutional-
pluralist regimes, but also of humanity.
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Serge Audier encourages us to examine Aron’s conception of constitutional-
pluralist regimes through the lens of Machiavelli, whose works aided Aron in 
understanding both the totalitarian and the constitutional-pluralist regimes of 
his epoch. As regards the latter, the relevant and perhaps shocking insight—no 
more in Aron’s time than in Machiavelli’s own time—is that constitutional-
pluralist regimes thrive on confl ict.
Serge Paugam revisits Aron’s course on class struggle, using it as a starting 
point for conceptualizing class relations in our time, by updating Aron’s research 
in three areas that Aron himself considered worthy of analysis: the increasing 
heterogeneity of the working class, the transformation of social confl icts, and the 
problem of persistent poverty in wealthy societies.
A question that has assumed greater importance today is whether increasing 
government intervention in the economy will set us on the “road to serfdom.” 
Although Aron sympathized with Hayek’s defense of liberty, he was never able 
to embrace the unfettered free market as warmly as Hayek did. Iain Stewart illus-
trates Aron’s middle-ground approach by setting Aron’s economic views within 
the context of the debates occurring in France at the time, thereby suggesting 
that we might come to a better understanding of Aron’s “cold war liberalism” if 
we see this as a continuation of the attempts to revise liberal economic theory 
during the Great Depression.
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